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Abstract 
Giving by individuals for development has been illustrated recently by some spectacular examples. A few 
people giving very large sums, and a very large number of people giving modest amounts, are both 
important phenomena in the field of development finance.  This paper considers how in theory such 
behaviour might be explained using the tools of economic analysis. The paper is about the economics of 
giving, but focused on why people give to a particular cause – world development. There has been an 
extensive literature on the total volume of giving, but much less on the allocation by cause. Giving for 
development does not seem to be adequately explained by either the “warm-glow” or the “public good” 
models. The paper suggests a new “identification” approach to individual giving, which combines the 
results focus of the public goods formulation with the scale of the warm glow model.  The analysis 
initially treats giving for development in isolation, but goes on to examine how development causes fit 
into the pattern of overall charitable giving by individuals and the pattern of giving over the individual 
lifetime.  
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1. Introduction 
 
  Giving by individuals for development has been illustrated recently by some 
spectacular examples. The gifts by Ted Turner, Bill Gates, and Warren Buffett have 
made available for global development sums that are truly remarkable. Equally 
remarkable in scale is the number of people who responded in 2004/5 to the Tsunami 
Appeal (NCVO and CAF, 2006). A few giving very large sums, and a very large 
number giving modest amounts, are both important phenomena in the field of 
development finance. In the UK, 1 person in 10 reports giving for development 
(Micklewright and Schnepf, 2007) and Oxfam’s voluntary income in 2004/5 was 
£177 million (Charity Trends, 2006). The aim of this paper is to consider how – in 
theory – such behaviour might be explained using the tools of economic analysis.
2 
The paper is about the economics of giving, but focused on why people give to a 
particular cause – world development. There has been an extensive literature on the 
total volume of giving, but much less on the allocation by cause. This criticism 
applies both to empirical research on giving, with some notable exceptions,
3 and to 
the theoretical literature (see the recent extensive survey by Andreoni, 2006). 
Different causes attract support for different reasons. In this paper, I consider how far 
giving to Oxfam is different from support for a local hospice.   
  
The literature on the economics of charitable giving, which dates back to 
Becker (1961), Boulding (1962) and Vickrey (1962), contains valuable insights, such 
as the difference between concerns for the “public good” and the personal benefit that 
                                                 
1 This research was supported by ESRC project grant “Giving to Development” (RES-155-25-0061), 
which forms part of the Non-Governmental Public Action programme. The project is being conducted 
in conjunction with John Micklewright, Cathy Pharoah and Sylke Schnepf. I am most grateful to them 
for discussion and suggestions, but they are not to be held responsible for the views expressed.   
 
2 The paper concentrates on economic models, but a full explanation clearly needs to draw on other 
literature, such as that in sociology: see, for example, Halfpenny (1999). 
3 See Walker and Pharoah (2002, section 6), Backus (2006), and Havens, O’Herlihy and Schervish 
(2006).See also the literature on support for environmental causes (for example, Foster et al, 2001).   2
people derive from the act of giving (“warm-glow”). This distinction provides a point 
of departure in section 2 of the present paper, but I argue that, taken on their own, 
neither the public good nor the warm glow models are fully satisfactory as a basis for 
analysing giving to development.  In section 3, I suggest a new “identification” 
approach to individual giving, which combines the results focus of the public goods 
formulation with the scale of the warm glow model.  The analysis in sections 2 and 3 
treats giving for development in isolation; in section 4, I examine explicitly the choice 
between different causes. How does development fit into the pattern of overall 
charitable giving by individuals? Here, a central feature of development is that it is a 
temporal process; it is hoped that assistance today will lead to a sustained 
improvement in living standards. This raises the question of the pattern of giving over 
the individual lifetime.  Section 5 summarises the conclusions about the key 
questions:  the total given to charity and its allocation among causes.  
  
  The paper deals with giving by individuals, and its relation to government 
policy and the policies of charitable organisations. There is an additional important 
sector – giving by institutions, such as companies, trade unions and foundations – but 
this is not covered. Nor does the paper consider giving by individuals in the form of 
volunteering, whether by acting as a fund-raiser, working in charity shops or by 
serving overseas. A further consideration not treated here is the “other side of the 
market”: the fund-raising activities of charities (see Weisbrod and Dominguez, 1986 
and Andreoni, 1998). As is noted by Micklewright and Wright, the economic 
literature on charitable giving has not focused much on the demand side of the 
market: “it has been the behaviour of donors rather than the actions of different 
charities that has been the subject of attention” (2005, page 139). Finally, purchases of 
“fair trade” goods are not treated explicitly, although the implicit transfer may be seen 
as forming part of the giving variable. 
 
 
 
2. Standard models applied to giving for development 
 
  When a person is deciding whether to have wine with the evening meal, then it 
is reasonable to assume that the alternative is beer, or fruit juice, or mineral water, and 
that this is the trade-off being considered. It is not, in general, a choice between a 
glass of wine and a paperback. In the case of giving for development, the alternative 
is less clear. Is the choice between giving for development and an evening out?  Or is 
the choice between giving for development and giving for medical research?  In this 
and the next section, I consider the first of these choices, concentrating on donation to 
a single charity at the expense of private consumption; in section 4, I treat the choice 
between different charitable objectives.   
 
The standard economist’s model of charitable giving (see Andreoni, 2006) 
assumes that individuals maximise utility, where utility derives from charitable 
donations, denoted by d, and from private consumption, equal to y-d, where y denotes 
total income.  The utility from donations has been assumed to take one of two main 
forms. The first is that derived directly from the act of giving, which has come to be 
known as the “warm-glow” (Andreoni, 1990); the second is derived from the 
achieved results of the gift, referred to as the “public good”.  In the first case, a person 
derives utility from giving to the Tsunami Appeal; in the second case, the person   3
derives utility from the fact that the Tsunami victims are being helped. As has been 
demonstrated in the literature, these two motives for giving can have quite different 
implications.  This is evident even without any formal analysis, as may be seen from 
asking how far official giving “crowds out” private giving? If, as in the 2005 UK 
Africa Commission, the government give a high profile to development aid, does this 
make individual citizens more or less likely to be willing to contribute?  The extent of 
government aid to the victims does not affect the warm glow that the person derives 
from his or her contribution, so that, on this basis, there is no crowding out. But, with 
the public good motive, government aid reduces the urgency of the public good case 
for giving, and hence tends to reduce the contributions by individuals. The distinction 
is therefore important. 
 
My aim here is to take these two standard models as a point of departure and 
investigate how far they apply in the specific case of giving for development.  
 
 
2.1 The Warm-Glow Motive 
 
  First, let us consider a purely warm-glow approach. In order to provide some 
mathematical shape to the model, let us assume that the utility function is additive and 
logarithmic: i.e. the utility derived from private consumption and from the 
contribution of gifts to development is 
 
 U  ≡ (1 − α) log{y – d} + α log{1 + d/d0}       ( 1 )  
 
where α (0 ≤ α < 1) and d0 (≥0) are constants whose role will be explained. The 
second term is zero if the person does not make any gift. The level of gifts that 
maximises U is given by 
 
 d  =  α y − (1 − α) d0 where this is positive;  
otherwise zero when y is less than (1 − α) d0/α     (2) 
 
The coefficient α shows the (constant) marginal propensity to give out of an extra £ of 
income. If you tithe a tenth of your extra income, then α = 0.1.  But the person is only 
assumed to do this if their income is sufficiently large. This is the role of d0, which 
governs the income level at which the person begins to give. The critical value of 
income is y* ≡ (1-α) d0 /α.  Giving as a function of income – the Engel curve for 
giving - is plotted in Figure 1. It may be noted that, with the assumptions made, 
giving changes continuously with income: for income just above y* the level of 
giving is close to zero. If a person were to say “I am now rich enough to become a 
donor and I will give a tenth of my income”, then such a jump in behaviour cannot be 
explained by the model.  
 
The theoretical framework set out above can be used to derive various policy 
implications. For example, we can see that the effect of charitable fund-raising 
activity may be represented by a shift upwards in the coefficient α, which increases 
the proportion of people giving and increases the marginal propensity to give – see 
Figure 1. This has implications for any statistical analysis of the impact of fund-
raising activity. If we are estimating the level of giving as a piece-wise linear function   4
of income, then we need to introduce the fund-raising variable in two ways: as 
shifting the intercept and as shifting the coefficient of income.  
 
One important concern missing from the warm-glow model is with the 
effectiveness of the charitable donation. In debates about aid for development a key 
role is played by issues of “effectiveness”. A reason frequently advanced for not 
giving is that the money is wasted: it disappears in administrative costs or is diverted 
to people other than the intended recipients. People may share the goal of wishing to 
aid poor countries but lack confidence in the means. Qualitative research (Atkinson 
and Eastwood, 2007) has shown the role played by negative stories about 
misgovernment and corruption in dissuading people from giving for development. It 
does indeed seem reasonable to assume that, in the case of development, a primary 
preoccupation of donors is with the usefulness of their contribution. Giving to a “good 
cause” means not just that the end purpose is desirable but that the charitable agency 
is effective. This brings us to the “public good” model. 
 
 
2.2 Public Good Motives 
 
  If giving behaviour depends on the achieved results, then a wider set of factors 
have to be taken into account. In addition to the leakages just discussed, the impact on 
the public good depends on the contributions of other donors and of the government. 
Suppose to begin with we consider the impact on the current circumstances of 
recipients; famine relief as opposed to long-term development (discussed in section 
4).  The utility function for an individual, one of n potential donors, may then be 
written 
 
 U  ≡ (1 − α) log{y – d} + α log{(1-ℓ) [d + δ(n−1) + gn]/r}      (3) 
 
The warm glow element has now been replaced by a more complex expression. The 
square bracket contains the individual gift, d, plus the total given by others. The total 
is made up of the giving by the other (n-1) donors averaging δ per person and of gn 
contributed by the government.  This is divided among the number of recipients, 
denoted by r. But a certain proportion ℓ of this total is lost in leakage.  
 
Suppose that the person takes as fixed the amounts given by others and by the 
government. The utility maximising choice of d by the individual becomes 
  
 d  =  α y  - (1-α) {δ(n − 1) + gn} where this is positive;  
otherwise zero when y is less than (1-α)/α{δ(n − 1) + gn}      (4) 
 
The giving function (4) is of the same mathematical form as before, with the intercept 
being replaced by a term that depends on the giving of others. From this, we can 
immediately see the extent of crowding out. Suppose that there is an increase of £1 in 
total government support (gn). From (4), we can see that the individual is predicted to 
reduce giving by all but a proportion α of this increase (or to reduce giving to zero). 
So, with α = 1/10, there is 90 per cent crowding out. Put another way, the overall total 
of aid is 
 
d + δ(n−1) + gn = α [ y  + δ(n−1)  +  gn]      (5)   5
 
The person treats the increase in gn as an increase in total resources and “spends” a 
fraction α on development assistance. (No allowance is made here for any taxes 
necessary to finance the increase in g; if taxes are increased, this will have an 
offsetting effect in reducing y, and the degree of crowding out will be larger.)   
 
The extent of leakage (ℓ) does not appear directly in the expression (4). (Nor 
do the number of recipients (r) – see below.) As may be seen from (3), the second 
term may be split into α log{(1-ℓ)/r} and α log{d + δ(n−1) + gn}, so that neither r nor 
ℓ affect the choice of d. As far as ℓ is concerned, this may appear surprising. One 
might expect that the willingness to give would depend on the extent of leakage. 
There are however two countervailing effects, just as with any consumer good. A rise 
in price causes us to buy a smaller quantity, but total spending only falls if the 
quantity reduction is proportionately larger than the price increase. The effect on total 
spending depends on the elasticity of demand. In the present case, the “price” of a 
transfer has increased: if there is 50 per cent leakage, then it costs £2 to transfer £1. 
The net amount transferred, d(1-ℓ), falls, but – with the assumed functional form – by 
the same percentage as the price increase, so total spending, d, remains unchanged. As 
formulated, therefore, the model does not capture the observation that increased 
leakages make people less willing to support development charities. We need either a 
different functional form or an alternative formulation.  
 
 
2.3 Public goods and large numbers 
 
The formulation does allow us to examine the key role of large numbers, 
which has led to criticism of the public goods approach by Sugden (1982) and others.  
Large numbers of potential recipients are a very evident feature of development.  
Everyone knows that the number of people living below the World Bank poverty line 
is measured in billions. A cheque for £1,000 will make a material difference to the 
financing of a local hospice; it would not, on its own, make a material difference to 
the solution of world poverty. At the same time, we have seen that the number of 
recipients does not enter the giving equation (4). This again suggests that the 
formulation has major consequences.  
 
It is however not just the number of recipients that is large, but also the 
number of potential donors, n. To discuss this, we need to take into account the 
responses of other donors. The term δ is the result of the decisions of others about 
their values of d. The outcome depends on what an individual believes about the 
behaviour of others. The standard assumption in the economics literature is that made 
above: i.e. people determine their giving assuming that the behaviour of others is 
independent of their own decision (a “Nash” assumption).  Suppose that this holds, as 
may indeed be plausible where n is large. If everyone is identical, then δ = d, and we 
can solve for the value of d  
 
 d  =  α / [n(1-α)+α] – (1-α)g / [(1-α)+α/ n ]       ( 6 )  
 
From this, we can see that the model implies that, as n rises, everyone reduces their 
donations. Moreover, the threshold income level rises, so that more and more people 
give zero. The larger the number of potential donors, the more willing people are to   6
“free ride” on the contributions of others.
4 Indeed, as n tends to infinity, individual 
giving goes to zero.
5 This is why Andreoni summarised the literature as saying that, as 
the number of people rises “warm-glow will become the dominant if not the exclusive 
motive for giving” (2006, page 1223). Given the large number of potential donors to 
fund world development, the public good model does not seem adequate. As Sugden 
argued many years ago, “the public good theory of philanthropy is untenable as an 
explanation of the behaviour of those people who contribute to large charities” (1982, 
page 348).  
 
  Taken on their own, neither the public good nor the warm glow models seem 
therefore satisfactory as a basis for analysing giving for development. They do not 
allow adequately for concerns about leakages, nor do they allow us to treat in a 
suitable way large numbers of potential donors and recipients. In the next section I 
suggest an alternative that blends the two approaches. 
 
 
 
3. The “identification model 
 
  A combination of the warm-glow and public goods formulations seems more 
relevant to the case of giving for development. Melding the scale of the warm-glow 
approach with the results focus of the public goods formulation yields an explanation 
of giving in the case of large populations that seems to capture the way in which 
giving is presented by charitable agencies. In what I shall call “the identification 
approach”, the donor is assumed to be concerned with the impact on the living 
standards of the recipients; it is not enough simply to put the cheque in the envelope. 
But the donor does not regard the cheque as being divided among millions of potential 
recipients. The donor is assumed to visualise a recipient or a family or a village. Such 
a visualisation is indeed much promoted by development charities, and is made 
concrete in programmes where donors “adopt” families, to whom the transfer is 
channelled. Even where there is no explicit adoption, donors often are encouraged by 
development charities to “identify” with the situation of recipients on a one-to-one or 
one-to-m basis, where m is a small number. For example, they see their gift as 
allowing an aid programme to be “extended to another village”.   
 
The identification approach may be formalised by writing the utility function 
as 
 
 U  ≡ (1-α) log{y – d} + α m log{π + (1 − ℓ)d/m + d0]}    (7) 
 
The potential donor attaches a weight α to the welfare of each of the m recipients, 
where this depends on their own resources, denoted by π and the amount given after 
leakage and divided by the number of recipients. There is, as in the original equation 
(1) a parameter d0 that reflects individual preferences.  The resulting level of giving is 
  
                                                 
4 As discussed by Jones and Posnett (1993, page 135), free-riding may be less with alternatives to the 
Nash assumption. If contributors expect that increases in their own giving will stimulate others to give 
more, then the degree of free-riding is reduced.  
5 Andreoni (1988) shows that, with individuals differing in income, as n increases, there are positive 
total donations but the proportion of the population who give, and the average gift, tend to zero.    7
  d =  {α y − (1 − α) (π + d0)/(1 − ℓ)} / [(1-α)/m +α]  
where this is positive;  
otherwise zero (when y is less than (1 − α) (π + d0)/ (α(1 − ℓ)))   (8) 
 
  Since giving does not go to zero as the number of potential donors becomes 
large (n does not enter (7)), the identification model may appear closer to that of 
warm-glow. In some respects, the giving relation is similar. There is an intercept and 
constant marginal propensity to give. But there are significant differences. First, the 
extent of leakage affects the amount given.  A rise in ℓ raises the threshold for giving 
and reduces the level of giving.  If the leakage is sufficiently large, no one will give.  
Second, the amount given depends on the perceived situation of the recipients, via the 
term π. Here there may be an impact of the media and NGOs. If the activities of 
bodies such as the Commission for Africa or of development charities make potential 
donors more aware of the low levels of living, then this will increase both the 
proportion of donors and the amount given.  Thirdly, the number of recipients per 
donor, m, affects the amount given but not the threshold. If donors extend their range 
of concern, increasing m, then this increases the level of giving. Suppose α = 0.1. 
Then, with m = 1, the term in square brackets in (8) is equal to 1; with m = 3, it is 
equal to 0.4, so that the amount given is 2½ times higher. 
 
  Does this mean that there is no crowding out?  Formulation (7) does not 
include a term in g or in the gifts of others. These variables do, however, enter 
indirectly via the term π, the living standard of the recipient in the absence of giving. 
There is crowding out to the extent that donors perceive that increases on government 
aid or in the gifts of others imply that the recipients are better off. This is a reason for 
entering the level of official development aid (ODA) as an explanatory variable in a 
time series analysis or in a cross-country cross-section study. The effect depends, 
however, on the perceived effectiveness of ODA. Suppose that the perceived relative 
effectiveness is θ, so that, taking for simplicity the case where m = 1, an increase in 
ODA increases π by θ (1-ℓ), then the degree of crowding out is (1-α)θ.  So if a person 
believes that government aid is only half as efficient as private donations, then (with α 
= 0.1) crowding out is reduced to 45 per cent. This means that, in the case of a time 
series analysis, we can introduce a separate crowding out variable; the coefficient 
divided by (1-α) provides an estimate of θ. In the limit, if people believe that 
governments are totally ineffective, then there is no crowding out.  Moreover, as θ 
gets smaller, the intercept of the giving function moves to the left. In other words, if a 
person says “government aid is wasteful, compared with Save the Children”, then 
they should be willing to give more themselves than if they believed government aid 
to be effective. 
  
  The “identification” model just described combines the scale of the warm-
glow approach with the results focus of the public goods formulation to yield an 
explanation of giving where there are large numbers of potential recipients and large 
numbers of potential donors. It generates a giving function and a giving threshold 
depending on observed variables such as income and the level of ODA, and on 
perceived variables, such as the extent of leakages and the effectiveness of aid, for 
which we can construct proxies.  Moreover, the underlying motivation seems close to 
the way in which giving is envisioned by charitable agencies. 
 
   8
 
 4. Development giving versus other causes and over time 
 
  So far giving for development has been considered in isolation.  I now analyse 
the allocation of a given total of giving among different causes, of which development 
is one. One way of viewing this procedure is in terms of a process of “two-stage 
budgeting”: a person first decides how much in total to give to charity and then 
allocates this total. In certain circumstances, it makes intuitive sense. People decide to 
go out for dinner and then choose between steak and fish when they see the menu. In 
the same way, we can suppose that the person has decided to give a sum a, and is 
considering how to allocate this sum between development and medical research. 
Such a process is consistent with utility maximisation under certain separability 
conditions (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980, Chapter 5), which are satisfied by the 
additive forms used here.  
 
The restaurant analogy may however be misleading for two reasons. The first 
is that the separability conditions may not hold, so that we cannot decompose the 
decisions in this way.  This is a serious possibility and serves to warn about the 
adoption of specific functional forms that may (implicitly) restrict our modelling of 
the decision. People may, for example, make life-style choices that have implications 
for all categories of expenditure. For instance, a person may respond to a rise in the 
price of oil by reducing their spending on travelling and by switching their charitable 
donations towards development charities working in oil-poor countries.   
 
The second respect in which the restaurant analogy is misleading is that, 
whereas people choose either steak or fish main courses, the donor may well divide 
the sum between the charities. This has been highlighted by the Undercover 
Economist (Tim Harford): “Someone with £50 to give away and a world full of 
worthy causes should choose the worthiest and write the cheque. We don’t. Instead, 
we give £2 to the street collector for Save the Children, pledge £15 to Comic Relief, 
another £15 to Aids research, and so on” (FT Magazine, 7/8 October 2006).  This 
assertion is borne out by evidence about the degree of concentration of giving 
behaviour in the UK provided by the CAF and NCVO Module in the Omnibus 
survey. Micklewright and Schnepf (2007) find in fact that, for all causes, the 
probability of a donor to one specific cause giving to another is higher than the 
unconditional probability of giving to the other cause.     
 
 
4.1 Allocating between charities 
 
  Suppose that we represent the utility from development giving by the 
“identification” motive represented by the second term of equation (7), and add a term 
for the utility from giving an amount b to medical care research, so that the “sub” 
utility function is  
 
 u  ≡  α m log{(1−ℓd)d/m + π + d0]} + β log [(1−ℓb)b+b0]    (9) 
 
where d + b = a, b0 and d0 are constants, and I have allowed for different degrees of 
leakage.  The choice is illustrated in Figure 2. The curve AB shows the marginal 
benefit from giving to development, starting at A and falling to B as d reaches the   9
whole of the charity budget. The curve CD is the same for medical research, but in the 
reverse direction, since giving to the medical charity rises as we move to the left. The 
person chooses the point P, where the marginal value is equated. The level of giving 
for development is given by 
 
  d = {α a + αb0/(1-ℓb)- β(π+ d0)/(1-ℓd)} / [β/m +α]    (10) 
 
The amount given for development rises with the total given, a; the fraction of an 
extra £1 being divided in proportions that depend on αm/β.   
 
In the case shown in Figure 2, the person chooses, quite rationally, to spread 
his or her donations. Having decided to give, they give to both causes. They do not 
plump for just one cause because there is declining perceived benefit from an 
additional £1. The relative amounts given to the two causes depend on the person’s 
relative concerns, on the perceived need, and on the relative effectiveness with which 
the two charities use the funds.  The last of these has been described in terms of 
leakage, but we have also to consider the spending power of £1 in different uses.  
Here giving for development may have an edge: building a medical centre in Uganda 
costs less (at the exchange rate) than one in Umbria. As is noted by Micklewright and 
Wright, “development charities are quick to emphasize the very low cost in Western 
terms of many of their interventions” (2005, page 139). 
 
On the other hand, it is quite possible that the person will give to only one 
charity. Indeed, in their analysis of charitable fund-raising efforts, Andreoni and 
Payne assume that individuals give only to “the charity nearest their ideal” (2003, 
page 794). If the values of the parameters are such that, in Figure 2, the point D lies 
above A, then the person gives only to the medical charity. We are at a “corner” with 
b = a and d = 0. For small levels of giving (i.e. a effectively zero), this corner 
solution happens where 
 
 ( β/α) .[(π+d0)/b0]  [(1-ℓb)/(1-ℓd)]  > 1         (11)   
 
In other words, where greater weight is attached in the utility function to the medical 
charity (β > α), where the situation is worse in the absence of help, and where it is 
more effective in using the resources (the loss rate ℓ is less). Not all of these are 
necessary. The medical charity may have a lower weight but a higher score on 
effectiveness.  But we can also see that a corner solution becomes less likely as total 
giving rises, since the marginal value of spending b = a falls. So that, where condition 
(11) holds, there will be a critical value of a, denoted by a*, such that people with 
total giving below a* give only to the medical charity, whereas people with total 
giving above a* give to both causes.   
 
  Does this two-stage budgeting mean that individual charities are playing a 
zero-sum game?  With fixed total giving, this may appear to be the case. Suppose that 
development charities become more effective, reducing ℓd. From (10), the level of d 
increases, and, with a fixed, giving to medical charities falls. But this overlooks the 
inter-relation with the first-stage. Even with additive separability, an improvement in 
the effectiveness of one charity makes charitable giving as a whole more attractive, 
and tends to increase the total given. If Oxfam becomes much more effective in using 
its resources, part of the extra giving for development is drawn from spending on non-  10
charitable purposes. For charities as a whole it is a positive-sum game, even if market 
shares do depend on their relative competitiveness. 
 
 
4.2 The time dimension 
 
  The model of decision-making adopted so far has been timeless. This has 
meant that we have not been able to consider the timing of giving in relation to the 
individual life-cycle. Yet this is an interesting dimension. For example, the 2005/06 
survey of individual charitable giving in the UK shows a shift towards younger 
groups giving more than in the previous year (NCVO and CAF, 2006, page 13). What 
determines the time path of giving over the life course? This seems particularly 
relevant to giving for development, where time is of the essence. If we believe that 
investment in development has a high rate of return, then it is more valuable that a 
person gives today than if they let the sum accumulate in their bank account before 
making a later gift. 
    
  A full treatment of the life-cycle of giving is undoubtedly complicated, but we 
can learn something from a highly simplified case.  What we want to know is why a 
person should delay making the gift, particularly when investment in development 
generates a much higher return (ρ) than donors earns on their savings (taken for 
simplicity to be zero).  One obvious reason that the gift is irreversible and that the 
donor may fear that he or she will later need the money. King Lear has left a strong 
impression.  This “precautionary” motive for delaying gifts is similar to the 
precautionary motive for saving.   
 
  To formalise this, suppose that at any date a person gets utility u(c) from 
personal consumption plus v(d) from gifts, where both u(c) and v(d) are functions 
such that the marginal gain is positive but decreasing. The marginal gain from 
consumption is infinite at zero consumption but the marginal gain from gifts is finite 
at zero gifts (allowing the choice of zero gifts).  For simplicity, I consider only two 
periods, when the person is working (denoted period 1) and when they are retired 
(denoted period 2). The person starts with a wage w, which they can consume, c1 in 
the first period, or give an amount d1, or save for the next period.  What happens next 
period is uncertain. There is a probability p that the person will suffer a loss, z, in 
which case all savings are used for consumption (equal to w-c1-d1-z) and there are no 
gifts. With probability (1-p), the person will be fine, and savings are divided between 
consumption and gifts next period, d2.  For simplicity, the real interest rate is assumed 
zero, so that consumption next year in this case is equals w-c1-d1-d2.  The person has 
therefore to choose c1, d1 and d2, and is assumed to do so in such a way as to 
maximise expected utility: 
 
 u(c1) + v(d1) + pu(w-c1-d1-z) + (1-p)u(w-c1-d1-d2) + v(d2)   (12) 
 
In the second period, if the person suffers a loss, by assumption no gifts are made, so 
that (where ′ denotes the first derivative) 
 
 u ′(w-c1-d1-z) > v′( 0 )         ( 1 3 a )  
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Where the person does not suffer a loss, the conditions for the second period choice 
are 
 
 u ′(w-c1-d1-d2) = v′(d2) or u′(w-c1-d1) > v′(0) and d2 = 0    (13b) 
 
The first period choice is made taking account of the future choices (conditional on 
the outcome), and requires that 
 
 u ′(c1) = pu′(w-c1-d1-z) + (1-p)u′(w-c1-d1-d2)      ( 1 3 c )  
 
and 
 
 u ′(c1) = v′(d1) or  u′(c1) > v′(0) and d1  =  0     (13d) 
 
We can deduce that if d2 is zero, then the person makes no gifts at all (the right hand 
side of (13c) is then greater than v′(0)). So that the pattern of giving is either to give in 
both periods or to give only in the second period. Put differently, if the person were 
obliged to give in both periods, then the amount given would be smaller or zero.  
Given the risk that they will suffer a loss, potential donors do not “frontload” their 
giving. 
 
Suppose however that we modify the assumptions so that there is a higher 
return to giving in the first period: v′(0) is larger for d1 than for d2.  In that case, 
provided that the return is sufficiently high, a person may be converted into a first-
period donor, and indeed may give only in the first period. It should be noted that this 
is concerned not with effectiveness per se but with the relative effectiveness in 
different periods. Development charities may be able to bring forward giving by 
stressing that time is of the essence.    
 
 
4.3 Disaster relief versus development aid 
 
  Within aid to poor countries, a distinction is often drawn between disaster 
relief and aid for sustained development. While development charities have been 
concerned with both immediate relief and with longer-term development, they have 
long tried to shift the balance to the latter. Nightingale has described how the 
Freedom from Hunger Campaign, launched in 1960, encouraged charities “to turn 
decisively from famine relief to what has become known as ‘aid in depth’” (1973, 
page 221). What is likely to determine the balance between these?  
 
Although in some cases disaster relief and development aid are hard to 
separate, in principle they have a different timescale. In the former case, immediate 
help is required, and there may be a reasonable expectation that relief needs only to be 
temporary. The contribution being made relates to the loss rather than to the general 
standard of living. People give to earthquake or flood victims in medium-income 
countries. Indeed, “identification” in this case may be closer to “insurance”. The 
implicit contract is that, in the event of oneself becoming a disaster victim, help will 
be forthcoming.  Yachtsmen’s support of the Royal National Lifeboat Institution has 
certainly that character. If that is the case, then one might expect the degree of support 
to rise with the perceived prevalence of unavoidable disasters, as with current   12
concerns about climate change. Denoting the prevalence of disasters by Q, this leads 
to the first term in a utility function that combines both motives: 
 
 u  ≡  Q α log{(1-ℓr)dr  + α0]} + β log [(1-ℓd)dd (1+ρ)+β0]   (18) 
 
The second term reflects the development motive, where ρ is the rate of return. The 
argument that investment provides continuing help has long been used by charities: 
“after the 1960 Agadir earthquake … the community’s customary diet of fish was left 
to rot in the sun, and people starved: War on Want provided a refrigerated fish hall” 
(Nightingale, 1973, page 221). But the longer-term nature of the investment may also 
mean that the results are less transparent, and offsetting the factor (1+ρ) may be a 
higher perceived leakage.  
 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Neither of the standard models used by economists appears wholly satisfactory 
as a basis for explaining giving for development. We need to combine the scale of the 
warm-glow approach with the results focus of the public goods formulation to yield 
an explanation of giving in the case of large populations. In section 3 I have suggested 
a new “identification” model that provides one way in which this can be done. 
 
An important element missing from many of the theoretical models is the 
perceived effectiveness of charitable giving for development. This affects the total 
level of giving, the allocation between development and other causes, and the 
allocation between disaster relief and development aid. 
 
Governments may affect individual giving through crowding out, but this 
should not be exaggerated; while the public goods formulation suggests that crowding 
out is very substantial, this is not necessarily the case with the identification model, 
and even in the public good case the effect is mitigated where the perceived 
effectiveness of official aid is low. If the government demonstrates greater efficiency 
in the application of ODA this may reduce individual giving, but if government makes 
people more aware of the scale of the problem, this has the reverse effect.  
 
The existing literature, both theoretical and empirical, has paid relatively little 
attention to the allocation of charitable funding by cause. This paper has focused on 
one specific cause – giving for development – and within this we need to distinguish 
between disaster relief and aid for sustained development. People may give to the 
cause that provides the “biggest bang for the buck”, but the size of the bang depends 
on the person’s relative concerns, on the perceived need, on the relative effectiveness 
with which charities use the funds, and on the purchasing power in different locations. 
Charities compete for donations, but even where donors practice “two-stage” 
budgeting, this does not mean that there is a zero-sum game. 
 
In the case of development funding, time is of the essence.  Optimistically, one 
can hope that there will come a time when world incomes will have sufficiently 
converged that the subject becomes redundant. Consideration needs therefore to be   13
given to the time path of giving. The paper has suggested a simplified model of giving 
over the life course, and this could be further elaborated.    14
References 
 
Andreoni, J, 1988, “Privately provided public goods in a large economy: The limits of 
altruism”, Journal of Public Economics, vol 35: 57-73. 
 
Andreoni, J, 1990, “Impure altruism and donations to public goods: A theory of 
warm-glow giving”, Economic Journal, vol 100: 464-477. 
 
Andreoni, J, 1998, “Towards a theory of charitable fund-raising”, Journal of Political 
Economy, vol 106: 1186-1213. 
 
Andreoni, J, 2006, “Philanthropy” in L Gerard-Varet, S Kolm and J Ythier, editors, 
Handbook for Giving, Reciprocity and Altruism, Elsevier: Amsterdam. 
 
Andreoni, J and Payne, A, 2003, “Do government grants to private charities crowd 
out giving or fund-raising?”, American Economic Review, vol 93: 792-812. 
 
Atkinson, R T A and Eastwood, A, 2007, “Public attitudes to overseas giving: Does 
government make a difference?”, S3RI Working Paper A07/05, University of 
Southampton. 
 
Backus, P, 2006, “Is charity a homogenous good? Variation in the determinants and 
motivations of charitable contributions across causes”, University of Warwick. 
 
Becker, G S, 1961, “Notes on an economic analysis of philanthropy”. 
 
Boulding, K, 1962, “Notes on a theory of philanthropy”, in F G Dickinson, editor, 
Philanthropy and Public Policy, Columbia University Press, New York. 
 
Deaton, A S and Muellbauer, J N J, 1989, Economics and Consumer Behaviour, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
 
Foster, V, Mourato, S, Pearce, D and Ozdemiroglu, E, 2001, The Price of Virtue: The 
Economic Value of the Charitable Sector, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham. 
 
Halfpenny, P, 1999, “Economic and sociological theories of individual charitable 
giving: complementary or contradictory”, Voluntas: International Journal of 
Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, vol 10: 197-215. 
 
Havens, J J, O’Herlihy, M A and Schervish, P G, 2006, “Charitable giving: How 
much, by whom, to what, and how?” in W P Powell and R Steinberg, editors, The 
Non-Profit Sector: A Research Handbook, second edition, Yale University Press, 
New Haven.  
 
Jones, A M and Posnett, J W, 1993, “The economics of charity”, in N Barr and D 
Whynes, editors, Current Issues in the Economics of Welfare, Macmillan, 
Basingstoke,  pages 130-152. 
 
Micklewright, J and Schnepf, S V, 2007, “Who gives for overseas development?”, 
S3RI Discussion Paper, University of Southampton.   15
 
Micklewright, J and Wright, A, 2005, “Private Donations for International 
Development” in A B Atkinson, editor, New Sources of Development Finance, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
 
NCVO and CAF, 2006, UK Giving 2005/06, NCVO and CAF, London and West 
Malling. 
 
Nightingale, B, 1973, Charities, Allen Lane, London. 
 
Sugden, R, 1982, “On the economics of philanthropy”, Economic Journal, vol 92: 
341-350. 
 
Vickrey, W, 1962, “One economist’s view of philanthropy”, in F G Dickinson, editor, 
Philanthropy and Public Policy, Columbia University Press, New York. 
 
Walker, C and Pharoah, C, 2002, A Lot of Give, Hodder and Stoughton, London. 
  
Weisbrod, B A and Dominguez, N D, 1986, “Demand for collective goods in private 
non-profit markets: Can fundraising expenditures help overcome free-rider 
behaviour?, Journal of Public Economics, vol 30: 83-96. 
   16
Giving for development
Income
Figure 1  Giving for Development
Effect of fund-
raising activity 
in raising α
y*
 
 
 
 
 
Giving for development
Figure 2 Choosing between giving for 
development and giving to a medical charity
Marginal value 
of giving to 
development
Giving for medicine
Marginal value 
of giving to 
medicine
A
B
D
C
P
 